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The public charge for hubris against slaves:  
the honour of the victim and the honour of the hubristês* 
Mirko Canevaro  




Four sources from the fourth century BCE state that the Athenian law on the graphê hubreôs 
covered also acts of hubris committed towards (εἰς) slaves (Dem. 21.47-49; Aeschin. 1.17; 
Hyp. fr. 120; Lyc. frr. 10-11.2 = Athen. 6.266f–267a).1 There is only one passage, to my 
knowledge, which may be reasonably understood as referring to such a charge brought for 
hubris committed against (what may possibly be) a slave: Din. 1.23 informs us that an Athenian 
lawcourt once convicted and passed the death penalty on Themistius of Aphidna because he 
assaulted a Rhodian lyre player at the Eleusinia.2 This Rhodian lyre player may have been a 
freedwoman, or a metic, but we cannot exclude the possibility that she may have been a slave. 
This is all the evidence we have for the actual use of the graphê hubreôs against slaves, and 
this paraphrase exhausts the information provided by the passage. We should not extrapolate 
from the paucity of the documentation that the procedure was hardly ever used in this way3 – 
the evidence of the orators is notoriously idiosyncratic in its coverage,4 and the Old Oligarch 
(1.10-12), for instance, gives the opposite impression that the procedure was used too 
frequently; we get the same impression from Dem. 21.49, where Demosthenes states that many 
had been executed for committing hubris against slaves (however exaggerated this claim may 
be). But the scanty evidence makes it impossible to provide a proper study of these charges, 
and it is not my intention here to attempt such a study. Exploring the issue of the possibility of 
a graphê hubreôs against a slave can rather serve as a magnifying glass which will allow us to 
identify certain criticalities in our understanding of what hubris was and how it was 
                                               
* mirko.canevaro@ed.ac.uk. This article has benefited from invaluable feedback from David Lewis, Edward 
Harris, Alberto Esu, Matteo Barbato, the two anonymous reviewers as well as the editor of JHS and audiences at 
the CA/CAS Annual Conference 2016, the University of Nottingham, Verona and Bowdoin College. The 
Leverhulme Trust has funded much of the time spent working on it. 
1 The provision is also found in two documents, at Aeschin. 1.16 and Dem. 21.47, purporting to report the actual 
law. Both documents are, however, forgeries: see Fisher (2001) 138-40; Harris in Canevaro (2013) 224-31. In any 
case, the provision is safely attested in the paraphrases. 
2 Pace MacDowell (1976) 29, Fisher (1992) 39–40, 66 (also Cohen (1991) 193), this cannot be a probolê, as 
probolai resulted in a vote of censure, not in actual penalties, let alone death. See Section 3 below. The only 
charge that could lead to the death penalty in such actions was a graphê hubreôs. The status of the Pittalacus of 
Aeschin. 1.54-66 (who appears to have attempted but then renounced a graphê hubreôs) is too dubious to draw 
any conclusion from his case. Aeschines refers to him often as a public slave (or a slave of Hegesander, or a slave 
of the Salaminians), yet he seems to be able to bring dikai and is very vocal about the hubris to which had been 
subjected – his rights and prerogatives seem incompatible with those of a slave, and the orators often refer to ex-
slaves (freedmen) as slaves. For these reasons, most scholars have argued that he was in fact a freedman. See for 
various positions e.g. Jacob (1928) 162; Todd (1993) 192–94; Harris (1995) 103; Cohen (2000) 131, 169; Fisher 
(2001) 190-91; (2004) 66–67; Hunter (2006); Ismard (2015) ch. 3 n. 58; Taylor (2015) 49-51. 
3 Cf. Morrow (1937) 218; Fisher (1995) 69-71. This is also the assumption made e.g. by Lanni (2016) 85-98, who 
believes that the prohibition on hubris against slaves was not enforced, but had an ‘expressive power’ that 
signalled a widely-adhered social norm, and thus conditioned behaviour towards slaves. Lanni is largely correct 
about the ‘expressive power’ of the norm and its effects on behaviour (see Section 4, below), but the evidence 
does not warrant the assumption that the law was never enforced (and note that we have limited evidence for the 
enforcement of the hubris law altogether, yet the evidence is enough to show that it was enforced). Cohen (2000) 
120-21 argues on the other hand that the law was indeed commonly enforced in court for hubris committed against 
slaves. 
4 Looking at Todd’s list of public and private actions mentioned in our sources ((1993) 98-122), it is remarkable 
for how many of them we lack an attested example. 
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conceptualized, of social attitudes and dynamics across institutional and ‘extra-institutional’ 
spaces of the democratic polis, and of the place of timê in these attitudes and dynamics. 
Why the law on hubris should include hybristic behaviour against slaves is far from 
straightforward, and it was not straightforward even for the Athenians of the fourth century 
BCE. The two extant non-fragmentary mentions of this provision explicitly allow for the 
puzzlement that this procedure may cause to the average Athenian. Aeschin. 1.17 introduces 
his explanation of the rationale of the law with the words: ‘It may be that someone at first 
hearing might wonder why on earth this term, slaves, was added in the law of hubris’ (trans. 
modified from Carey); Dem. 21.48 addresses the judges with the words: ‘Listen, men of 
Athens, to how humane this law is: it states that not even slaves deserve to be the victims of 
hubris. Why is this, by the gods?’,5 and then proceeds to explore the puzzlement of the 
barbarians. As we shall see, this puzzlement stems from the fact that in Athens masters were 
legally allowed to do to their slaves virtually anything they wished, and even other Athenians 
had significant latitude in how they treated other people’s slaves (at least in certain 
circumstances). Within such a legal framework, justifying how one could be convicted of 
hubris against a slave required considerable intellectual effort, which forced the orators (and 
their audiences) to lay bare their conceptualization both of what hubris was and why it had to 
be banned from all social relations, and of the position of slaves in social relations from the 
point of view of the citizens acting within the formal institutions of the polis.  
Understanding these conceptualisations and their relation to social reality is essential 
because, as Vlassopoulos has argued, formal and informal sites of collective association (‘free 
spaces’ in his formulation)6 were ‘particularly important for the formation of political and social 
identities’, and these sites saw the constant mixing and interaction of citizens, metics and 
slaves.7 Scholars have been stressing in recent years the pervasiveness of social networks and 
associations that cut across the legal statuses in the day-to-day (social and political) life of the 
polis.8 Sobak, in a ground-breaking article, even shows that these sites of cross-status 
interaction (and the workshop in particular) contributed to the production of democratic 
knowledge, mobilized then in the institutions of the polis.9 But while much of the work done 
has served to highlight the importance of these networks and associations, comparatively little 
attention has been paid to the quality of the social relations that these networks and associations 
involved – were they hierarchical or horizontal, violent or collaborative?10 It is argued that in 
these social spaces legal status and the institutions of the polis simply did not matter,11 and the 
(admittedly unstated) assumption seems to be that, by downplaying status distinctions based 
on the legal and political order, these spaces facilitated widespread horizontal, non-hierarchical 
social interactions between free and slaves. Sobak, for instance, repeatedly stresses that these 
sites created social capital across the board (although his main concern is not to investigate 
                                               
5 Translations from Dem. 21 are (modified) from Harris (2008). 
6 Cf. Evans and Boyte (1992) 17 for this expression, which there refers, however, to places of resistance to the 
dominant culture (cf. Sobak (2015) 669 n. 3). For the problems with postulating for democratic Athens a popular 
culture opposed to that authorised by the formal institutions of the state see Canevaro (2017a). 
7 Vlassopoulos (2007) 51 and passim. See also Vlassopoulos (2016). 
8 See e.g. the essays in Taylor and Vlassopoulos (2015), and in particular the introduction, for the status questionis. 
See also Ismard (2010); Azoulay and Ismard (2018).  
9 Sobak (2015). 
10 One exception is Hermann (2006) passim; (2011) 56-63 on slavery in Athens. Hermann paints a rosy picture of 
slave/free interaction in Athens. He sees, however, no disconnect between the political/legal sphere and social 
reality in this area. 
11 Vlassopoulos (2007); (2009); (2016). Gottesman (2014) also drives too big a wedge between ‘institutional’ and 
‘extra-institutional’ spaces, which he identifies as ‘the street’; see Canevaro (2017c) for a critical discussion of 
this study. 
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social interaction, but rather knowledge production),12 and, despite arguing that informal and 
formal institutions were fundamentally aligned in the democratic system, he still believes that 
the legal order was more or less irrelevant to the workings of these sites, that ‘opinions and 
knowledge were generated prior to and outside of the formal structures of governance’.13 
Vlassopoulos sensibly warns us that we cannot assume that legal distinctions and legal 
discourse and ideology simply reflect social reality – they are constructs and need to be 
investigated and explained as such.14  
Within this scholarly landscape, the issue of the graphê hubreôs against slaves stands at the 
crossroads of several preoccupations: first, it is evidence of the legal institutions actively 
meddling in (and even facilitating) those cross-status social interactions recognized as central 
to the ‘free spaces’ of Athenian society; second, the discussions of this provision in the orators 
are evidence of how these interactions were conceptualized at the level of the institutions (and 
ideology) of the Athenian polis; third, these discussions were addressed to popular courts 
composed of Athenian citizens (the majority of whom were non-elite, and even actually poor, 
citizens),15 the very individuals that were the protagonists of many of those cross-status 
interactions, and therefore provide a commentary on how they conceptually reconciled their 
privileged status as citizens (and often slave-masters) with the pervasiveness of slave/free 
social interaction in ‘free spaces’. Section 2 of this essay surveys the various explanations 
advanced by scholars of the possibility of a graphê hubreôs against slaves, highlighting their 
weaknesses and pointing out their reliance on a problematic view of hubris as a zero-sum 
transaction that involves the simple transfer of timê from the victim to the perpetrator. Sections 
3 and 4 argue against the suitability of this paradigm through an examination of social 
interactions that are described as characterized by hubris and liable to graphê hubreôs, with 
particular reference to the one extant speech for a graphê hubreôs, Demosthenes’ Against 
Meidias. Section 5, the concluding section, building on the previous discussion, argues that 
hubris against slaves was conceptualized as concerned with the disposition and moral 
obligations of the hubristês, with his honour, and did not imply any formal recognition of any 
claims of the slave. It also explores the implications of my findings for our understanding of 
Athenian social interactions involving citizens and slaves, and the role of the formal institutions 
of the polis in facilitating and yet circumscribing the implications of these interactions. 
 
2. Views of hubris, the role of the graphê hubreôs and the economy of timê 
 
The Athenian public charge for hubris is generally understood as aiming to protect the ‘rights’ 
and timê of the victim, according to the influential analysis of Fisher.16 While scholars such as 
MacDowell, Dickie and Cairns have stressed the centrality of the disposition of the agent 
(rather than the effects on the victim) to the concept of hubris, this aspect has gone virtually 
                                               
12 Sobak (2015) passim. 
13 Sobak (2015) 706 n. 72. 
14 Vlassopoulos (2016). He is, however, perhaps too ready to postulate irreconcilable opposition between legal and 
social spaces and conceptions – see Section 4 below.  
15 Jones (1957) 36-37, 124 argued that in the fourth century the judges were mainly middle-class; contra Markle 
(1985); Rhodes (1981) 691; Hansen (1991) 185-86; Todd (1990). Todd’s discussion is the most detailed, but his 
conclusion that the courts were representative of a distinctive class of farmers, with their own values, that 
constituted the majority of the Athenian population is dependent on an outdated picture of the social and economic 
composition of the Athenian population (cf. Harris (2002) and Lewis, Harris and Woolmer (2015) for the 
prominence of market exchange and horizontal work specialization, and Hansen (2006) 67-84, Ober (2015) 86-
88 for the high level of urbanization). MacDowell (1995) 156-58 shows that, despite some exaggeration, the 
picture of the average judges provided in the Wasps as elderly, thoroughly destitute and dependent on the daily 
three obols for the survival of their families, is reliable. 
16 Fisher (1976-1979); (1992). 
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unnoticed in studies of Greek law and oratory and of Athenian democracy.17 As the graphê 
hubreôs protected the timê of the victim (and therefore his rights, his prerogatives), it has been 
interpreted as central to the workings of the democratic system. In one of the most influential 
readings, advanced by Ober, the graphê hubreôs had the role of protecting the ‘democratic 
dignity’ of the Athenian citizens, connected to fundamental attributes rather than to 
performance, and by which all citizens enjoyed protection from humiliation and infantilization. 
As timê in democratic Athens was no longer the exclusive attribute of an aristocracy, but all 
citizens of the democratic state came to enjoy a significant amount of timê by virtue of their 
citizen status, the existence of a crime of hubris became a safeguard of these rights for all 
citizens. No one could humiliate and dishonour a citizen, as denying any citizen his dignity 
would have meant undermining the very value of citizenship. This is the reason why hubris 
was prosecuted through a public action, a graphê, even when the actual manifestation of the 
crime could very much look like a private kind of offence.18  
This line of interpretation is very attractive, but is at first sight called into question by the 
fact that the law on hubris makes also hubris committed against slaves liable under the graphê 
hubreôs. This is problematic because, if the hubris sanctioned by the law consists, with Fisher, 
in ‘the committing of acts of intentional insult, of acts which deliberately inflict shame and 
dishonour on others’,19 then sanctioning hubris against someone requires an implicit recognition 
of his claims to timê. If the law envisages hubris committed against a slave – the denying of 
the slave’s timê to increase one’s own – then the slave must have some timê to begin with, with 
the rights and prerogatives that come with it, which should not be ignored. In other words, if 
hubris has to do with treating others as if they were of lesser status, then the possibility of 
hubris against slaves implies that there could be a lesser status than that of a slave. Even worse, 
because hubris is sometimes defined as treating others as if they were slaves (e.g. Dem. 
21.180), the implication seems to be that treating slaves like slaves could be considered 
hybristic.20  
This problem has been recognized in scholarship, and various solutions have been proposed, 
with most interpretations falling roughly into two camps: those who believe that the hubris 
sanctioned by the law was not technically against the slave because the slave had no timê and 
those who conclude instead from the law that slaves were in fact recognized a modicum of 
timê. Orlando Patterson, for instance, in line with his hugely influential definition of slavery as 
the ‘permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons’, 
considers the possibility of hubris against a slave absurd.21 Fisher, on the other hand, concludes 
that ‘the hybris-law demanded that some attention be paid to the limited degree of humanity, 
honour’ of slaves. Ober similarly argues that the ‘extension of some legal protection to 
noncitizens points to how the recognition of dignity as a general attribute of persons might 
arise from active defense of civic dignity as a public good’. Along similar lines, Cohen believes 
                                               
17 MacDowell (1976); Dickie (1984); Cairns (1996). For studies of hubris as a legal offence see Section 3. The 
exception is of course MacDowell (1990) 18-22, who stresses the dispositional aspect of hubris in the context of 
a discussion of the graphê hubreôs, but his influential commentary has been generally read through the lens of 
Fisher’s understanding of hubris, as will be clear from my discussion of general interpretations of the graphê 
hubreôs. 
18 Ober (1996) on Dem. 21, and (2012) on ‘democratic dignity’. See also e.g. Ruschenbusch (1965); Murray (1990); 
Fisher (1992) 36-85; Van Wees (2011) on the origins and aims of this public charge. 
19 Fisher (1992) 148. 
20 I paraphrase here the concise and very effective formulation of the problem offered by Fisher (1995) 45. 
21 Patterson (1985) 86-88. On this definition and its problems see Lewis (2017). Gernet (1917) 183-97 also argued 
against the possibility of the honour of a slave and proposed an idiosyncratic reading of hubris to avoid this 
problem. For a discussion of Gernet’s conception of hubris vis-à-vis Fisher’s, see Demont (2006). 
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that the law on hubris protected slaves from all kinds of abuse, and Morrow that it allowed 
third parties to prosecute masters for mistreating their slaves.22  
Other scholars, such as Harris and Lewis, however, have rightly noted that it is hard to 
believe that the Athenians may have recognized even a modicum of ‘dignity’, ‘rights’ or timê 
applying absolutely to slaves, given the extensive powers masters had to punish (and maltreat) 
their slaves. Athenian writers liberally advised using beatings and violence to control and 
discipline slaves (e.g. Xen. Oec. 3.4, 9.15), and we have plenty of attestations of brutal 
treatment of slaves (e.g. Pl. Leg. 6.7776d-e; 777a).23 There were virtually no legal restrictions 
on the masters’ rights to mistreat their slaves.24 All manners of corporal punishments were 
allowed,25 and speakers in the lawcourts made no attempt to conceal their violence against 
slaves.26 Sexual abuse of female slaves was also both within the master’s prerogatives and 
perfectly acceptable.27 Even killing one’s slave incurred only low-level pollution, which could 
be washed away by privately performed purificatory rituals, and no legal consequences.28 The 
unlimited prerogatives given to masters by the law seem incompatible with any legal 
recognition of a slave’s absolute claims to timê.29 
Because they recognize the master’s wide prerogatives, some scholars conclude that a 
master could not commit hubris against his slave, and that therefore the graphê hubreôs must 
have sanctioned only hubris committed against other people’s slaves. It is certainly a 
reasonable point that proving hubris committed by masters against their slaves must have been 
exceptionally hard, and therefore the procedure is unlikely to have been used in this way often, 
or perhaps at all (although one can perhaps imagine some hypothetical scenarios, see Section 
4 below). But the corollary of this reconstruction is normally that the law did not then protect 
the timê of the slave per se, but rather that of the master, or, as argued recently by Dmitriev, 
had the aim of protecting the master’s household (oikia). Strictly speaking, therefore, the victim 
of hubris was the master of the slave, who had his honour damaged by proxy by the act of 
hubris against his slave (as a member of his oikia), and not the slave.30 A potential parallel for 
these dynamics would be Lys. 1.4, 25, where Euphiletus states that Eratosthenes’ seduction of 
his wife was hubris towards himself, his children and his house – they were victims, as it were, 
by proxy.31 But there are problems with this parallel and with this interpretation. First, while in 
this interpretation the slave is not directly the victim of hubris, Euphiletus does not deny that 
the wife is also directly the victim of hubris: at Lys. 1.16 he reports the words of the mysterious 
                                               
22 Fisher (1995) 75; Ober (2012) 843; Cohen (2000) 160-67; (1998) 116 n. 62; Morrow (1937). See also Lanni 
(2016) 86-98, whose position is very much in line with Fisher’s and Ober’s, and who believes that the law does 
imply that the slaves had a modicum of honour (Lanni (2016) 88-89). She, on the other hand, acknowledges that 
Aeschin. 1.17 and Dem. 21.46 do not explain the norm as aimed at protecting the slaves (on these passages see 
Section 4 below), and ultimately reads the law on hubris as protecting the democracy, that is the ‘democratic 
dignity’ of citizens. It should be noted that Cohen and Morrow postulate a much higher level of protection for 
slaves than Fisher, Ober and Lanni allow for. 
23 When Xen. Hell. 5.3.7 states that a master should not punish a slave out of anger, this is in the context of advice 
for the successful management of slaves, not a commentary on legal rules. 
24 See in particular Harris (2006) 271-79 and the full discussion in Lewis (2018) 39-48.  
25 Hunter (1994) 165-73; Lévy (1974) 39-41 and Konstan (2013) on violence against slaves in comedy. 
26 E.g. Lys. 1.18-22 (cf. Xen. Mem. 2.1.16; Arist. Rhet. 1380a14-24) with Lewis (2018) 41. 
27 E.g. Lys. 1.12, Ar. Pax 573, 1138; Ach. 273, Xen. Oec. 10.12, Hyp. Ath. 24 with Lewis (2018) 41-2. 
28 Ant. 6.4 (cf. Isoc. 12.181, Pl. Leg. 9.868a) with Harris (2006) 261-62; (2008) 103 n. 92 and Lewis (2018) 42. 
For a modern parallel for such an arrangement see Paton (2001) 926, cited in Section 4 below. 
29 With ‘absolute’, I mean claims to timê that apply irrespective of the context, and are therefore institutionally 
recognised by the polis and its laws. See Section 4 below for context-specific claims to timê. 
30 E.g. Harrison (1968) 172; Mactoux (1988) 336-38; Harris (2008) 103. Cf. Murray (1990) 144-45. An example 
of this dynamic would be the treatment of the speaker’s and his associates’ slaves by Conon and his gang at Dem. 
54.4. See recently Dmitriev (2016) for the focus on the oikia. 
31 Fisher (1995) 64-65. On this case see Harris (2006) 297-332. 
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informant: ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ ὁ ὑβρίζων εἰς σὲ καὶ τὴν σὴν γυναῖκα ἐχθρὸς ὢν ἡμῖν τυγχάνει 
(‘for the man who is behaving with hubris towards you and your wife is actually our enemy’).32 
Second, all the paraphrases of the law state explicitly that the hubris punished was against the 
slave (Dem. 21.47-9; Aeschin. 1.17; Hyp. fr. 120; Lyc. 10-11.2), not against the master, 
whereas Euphiletus equally explicitly states that the hubris was also against himself, his 
children and his house. Third, none of the explanations that the orators offer of the provision 
banning hubris against slaves (even when they are trying very hard to deny that the law 
accorded the slave any claim to timê) argue that the point was to protect the master – this is not 
how the law was interpreted (see Section 4 below). Fourth, in order for the master’s honour to 
be damaged ‘by proxy’ by abuse and insults against one of his slaves, we need to postulate a 
very high degree of dependence of his timê on the social life and even the behaviour of the 
slave, one that is very unlikely to have been acceptable to the Athenians or recognized by their 
laws. The relationship between a male’s honour and the sexual honour of his free female 
dependants is, on the other hand, widely recognized by scholarship as one of the most salient 
features of so-called ‘honour societies’ – this is why seducing Euphiletus’ wife was hubris also 
against Euphiletus. Ultimately, the law is quite explicit: the prohibition is on hubris against a 
slave, per se. 
All these attempts to solve the impasse of the prohibition on hubris against slaves have in 
common an underlying understanding that ‘honour was a scarce non-material commodity, 
pursued mainly by men in small-scale, face-to-face communities in more or less aggressive 
forms of zero-sum competition’.33 On this view, a hybristic act dishonours the victim and 
transfers timê from the victim to the perpetrator, i.e. the one’s loss is the other’s gain. In some 
cases this understanding is explicit (e.g. Ober, Cohen), in others only implicit, but still easily 
detectable (Mactoux, Patterson).34 Fisher’s model is in this respect more sophisticated and yet 
it ultimately fails to challenge this zero-sum understanding of honour: on the one hand, Fisher 
acknowledges timê’s connection with issues of justice and that dishonouring others can in some 
cases be dishonourable for the perpetrator; on the other, his focus on the dishonouring act, on 
the transaction between victim and perpetrator and on its effects on the victim perpetuates a 
notion of honour as a commodity that is acquired by taking it away from (dishonouring) 
someone else – this is why, to account for the possibility of hubris against slaves, he needs to 
conclude that slaves possess a limited amount of timê.35 If timê, that which is infringed (and 
‘transferred’ from the victim to the perpetrator) in cases of hubris, is a (scarce, non-material) 
commodity, then, in order for hubris to occur, the victim needs to have some timê to start with. 
Thus, if the law contemplates hubris against slaves, then either slaves are accorded some timê, 
or hubris must in reality be directed against someone else.  
Several recent studies of the workings of honour in various societies have, however, shown 
that this picture of honour as a zero-sum game is misguided.36 Honour – that is, intended as 
including both aspects of the interplay of demeanour and deference studied by Erving Goffman 
                                               
32 Lanni (2016) 92-93 also notes that in cases involving hetairai and entertainers at symposia hybristic behaviour 
damaged the honour both of the slave and of the master. 
33 The formulation represents the view assailed by Cairns (2011) 23. For some notable examples of this 
understanding of honour see Peristiany (1965); Bourdieu (1965); Gilmore (1987); Walcot (1970); Miller (1990) 
29-34; Bowman (2006). This approach finds its origin in Benedict’s (1964) hugely influential study of Japanese 
culture and is reflected, in Greek studies, most notably in Dodds (1951), Finley (1954) and more recently in works 
such as Apfel (2011) e.g. pp. 216–17, 219, 223, 229, 231, 241, 243. Horden and Purcell (2000) identify a discrete 
Mediterranean cultural area characterised precisely by such notions of honour and shame. 
34 Cf. Cairns (1996) 32 n. 150. 
35 Cairns (1994) brings this tension in Fisher’s approach to the fore. 
36 A parallel for these recent challenges to zero-sum views of honour can be found in the study of homoerotic 
relationships in Greek society: despite some problems with his approach, Davidson (2007) challenges an 
understanding of homoerotic relationships as a zero-sum game between penetrator and penetrated. 
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as central to social interaction37 – is not attained or lost by dishonouring others or being 
dishonoured by others. As Appiah has shown, social actors in all societies retain their honour 
by abiding by specific honour codes, and therefore by behaving and treating others in socially 
acceptable ways, according to their rank, their specific dignity and their own sense of honour 
(as long as this is legitimate).38 Honour codes are variable among cultures, yet whether we are 
talking about 19th-century China, modern Pakistan, Homeric society or early-modern Britain, it 
appears that honour codes have in common the aim of securing a certain level of social 
harmony, or at least of reducing social strife, by regulating social relations. In no society does 
honour create a bellum omnium contra omnes, and when such a situation occurs, it represents 
the breakdown of the system, rather than its natural outcome. The respect of others and one’s 
own self-respect (because the honour code must be internalized to be binding) depend on 
performing socially to a certain standard and abiding by certain rules of behaviour. As a rule, 
anti-social behaviour is dishonourable. To give only two examples of recent historical 
scholarship that has made these points forcefully,39 one could look at Cairns’, Van Wees’ and 
Scodel’s work on Homeric society and at Linda Pollock’s on early-modern British aristocracy.40 
Pollock downplays the role of violence in early-modern English honour codes, and argues 
instead that they in fact promoted stability. She shifts the focus from the study of outbursts of 
violence to the workings and negotiation of honour in day-to-day situations, and shows how 
honour typically concerned peacekeeping and social harmony. In her words, ‘Honor could be 
an unsettling force, but for the most part it enhanced social cohesiveness and communality. 
Honor gave an individual dignity and worth, supplied a model for behavior, and provided a 
connection to others. [Honor] was part of an ethos of a communal society, which prescribed 
that all work together to help support the honor and reputation of those with whom one was 
connected … An honourable name was not the individual’s to maintain alone.’ And moreover 
‘honor was not just a concept of entitlement. It was also one of obligation, mandating virtues 
such as hospitality, arbitration, and reconciliation … Honorable men and women lived in 
charity with their friends, neighbors and family.’ This picture is not unlike that painted by 
Douglas Cairns for the workings of honour in Homeric society: ‘Homeric honour is neither 
unidimensional nor primitive. It involves complicated and multifaceted negotiations between 
individual claims and others’ recognition and invokes the full range of norms and values by 
which Homeric society operates … though Homer’s heroes are proud and independent, their 
pursuit of honour implies a community with both the power to judge them and the ability to 
enlist individuals’ honour in support of the security and cohesion of the group. Individual 
identity is intimately bound up with group membership.’41 
In the next three sections I shall re-examine the graphê hubreôs to show that an 
understanding of this procedure, and of the concept of hubris, compatible with this framework 
can in fact accommodate the sanction of hubris against slaves without the complications 
recognized by much scholarship. 
 
3. Hybristic conduct and disposition in the graphê hubreôs 
 
Fisher’s major (and fundamental) contribution to our understanding of hubris is the realization 
that hubris, as a social phenomenon, must be construed in terms of timê. The failure to 
                                               
37 See Goffman (1967); cf. Van Wees (1992) 69–77. 
38 Appiah (2010). See also Stewart (1994); Krause (2002); Welsh (2008); Appiah (2010); Sessions (2010); Oprisko 
(2012); Cunningham (2013); Rabbås (2015). 
39 But see also e.g. Kane (2009); Baker (2013) 35-76. 
40 Cairns (1993); (2011); van Wees (1992) 69–77; Scodel (2008) 1-32; Pollock (2007). 
41 Cairns (2011) 38. 
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recognize this fact is the great weakness of MacDowell’s interpretation of the concept.42 By 
focusing his interpretation on the act itself and the intentional dishonour caused to the victim, 
however, Fisher ends up implicitly reiterating a picture of honour as a (scarce, non-material) 
commodity pursued through zero-sum competition between two actors, which involves the 
transfer, through acts of dishonouring, of timê from the victim to the hubristês. This picture of 
the workings of timê is, as we have seen, unsatisfactory. In an important contribution, Cairns 
has shown, moreover, that Fisher’s definition fails to explain many instances of hubris attested 
in the sources.43 
I shall repeat here Cairns’ analysis of only one relevant example, which illustrates the 
problem. At Dem. 36.42, in a trial against Phormio, the speaker argues that if the judges side 
with Apollodorus and hand over to him the sums he is claiming, they will see Phormio in 
extreme need, while Apollodorus will behave with hubris and spend lavishly on his vices. 
Fisher tries to argue that Apollodorus’ lavish spending after his victory would constitute hubris 
in that it would be a deliberate slap in the face for Phormio, reduced to poverty. And yet, as 
observed by Cairns, it is difficult to construe this situation as focusing on the deliberate 
dishonouring of Phormio. The focus is on Apollodorus’ conduct, disposition, self-absorption, 
which can result in ignoring others’ claims to timê, but whose purpose is not explicitly to ignore 
them. Apollodorus’ behaviour is defined as hybristic in the absence of a specific and explicit 
victim that he dishonours with intent. All that seems to be necessary to qualify his behaviour 
as hybristic is excessive self-assertion (and overvaluation of his claim to timê), and the presence 
of an audience (the judges/Athenians in this case) being witness to it and considering his 
behaviour dishonourable.44 Cairns finds several such cases and concludes convincingly that 
hubris is ‘[e]xpressing one's excess energy self-indulgently … placing oneself and one’s 
pleasure first, and thus losing sight of one’s status as one among others’. Thus, although ‘self-
aggrandizement constitutes an incursion into the sphere of others’ honour, because the concept 
of honour is necessarily comparative’, the concept of hubris ‘can accommodate purely 
dispositional, apparently victimless forms of self-assertion’.45 
The priority of the disposition over the act in the concept of hubris is the key to 
understanding how the Athenians conceptualized hubris against slaves, but applying it to the 
judicial sphere poses distinctive challenges. Athenian charges originated from specific acts and 
therefore necessitated a victim – ‘victimless’ hubris would have hardly been liable to a graphê 
hubreôs.46 And, in fact, all attested cases of actual or potential graphai hubreôs involve specific 
acts and victims: the striking of magistrates (an archôn and a proedros) in the course of their 
duties (Dem. 21.36); the striking by Taureas of the fellow-chorêgos Alcibiades (Dem. 21.147; 
[Andoc.] 4.20); Ctesicles hitting his enemy with a horse-whip during the festival procession 
(Dem. 21.180); the treatment of the Rhodian lyre-player by Themistius mentioned in Section 
1 (Dein. 1.23); the accuser of Dem. 54 being beaten up by Conon and his gang; the accuser of 
Isoc. 20 being beaten up by Lochites; the trierarch punched by Theophemus ([Dem.] 47.38-
45); the hoped-for (but not realized) imprisonment and beating up of the free boy sent into 
Apollodorus’ rose-garden ([Dem.] 53.16); the imprisonment of a free boy from Pellene by 
Menon (Dein. 1.23); even the insults by Philocleon to a man at Ar. Ves. 1417-41.47 But what 
                                               
42 MacDowell (1976); (1990) 18-22. See also Dickie (1984). 
43 Cairns (1996). 
44 Cairns (1996) 9. Contra Fisher (1992) 113. 
45 Cairns (1996) 32. 
46 Cairns (1996) 6 n. 32 also notes that Aristotle’s focus, in the Rhetoric, on the act and the victim is due to the 
judicial context of his discussions of hubris. See also MacDowell (1990) 20. 
47 For the list and discussion of these cases see Fisher (1992) 38-43. Note, however, that Fisher misinterprets, with 
MacDowell, the scope of the probolê, and therefore reads as possible probolai cases that must have probably been 
graphai hubreôs. See Section 3 below. 
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exactly was the accuser meant to prove? That the act(s) under discussion had been committed 
intentionally and had caused dishonour to the victim, in accordance with Fisher’s definition of 
hubris as ‘the committing of acts of intentional insult, of acts which deliberately inflict shame 
and dishonour on others’?48 Or rather, in accordance with Cairns’ definition, that that the acts 
resulted from a hybristic disposition and were judged by their audience to be dishonourable,49 
regardless of whether the specific victim had actually lost any timê?  
I propose to investigate this problem through an analysis of the arguments of Demosthenes’ 
Against Meidias. I take this to be the only extant speech written for a graphê hubreôs. Some 
scholars, following MacDowell, have interpreted it as a case of probolê, but this results from a 
misinterpretation of the scope of probolê. Harris has argued in several places that this is a 
graphê hubreôs and in a forthcoming paper reviews the evidence systematically to show not 
only the nature of the charge, but the relevance of the arguments to a charge of hubris.50 
Demosthenes deals with Meidias’ specific acts, for which the graphê hubreôs was brought, in 
the first part of the speech (1-76): here he describes in detail the behaviour of Meidias towards 
him, in his quality as choregos at the Dionysia, and why these ways of behaving qualify as 
hubris, giving also reasons for his choice of legal procedure. At 77-127 he adds a discussion 
of previous acts committed by Meidias against Demosthenes, instances of his hubris. At 128-
42 he supplements these with a discussion of Meidias’ hubris against others, completing the 
picture of Meidias as a hubristês. The following paragraphs (143-74) deal with the second stage 
of the trial, the timêsis, and argue against Meidias’ plea for mercy, made on the basis of his 
public record, in the decision over the penalty. The epilogue (175-227) covers various topics, 
often returning to points made beforehand (e.g. Meidias’ contempt for the people at 193-204 
and the fact that the laws are the best protection against the hubris of the powerful at 219-25).51 
It is important to trace what exactly Demosthenes is trying to prove throughout the speech. 
The first and perhaps most important indication of his argumentative priorities, which 
defines what the speech is about, is in the first sentence: ‘The violence (aselgeia), judges, and 
the hubris, of which Meidias always makes use in his dealings with everyone, I think is well 
known to all of you and to the other citizens.’ The prominent position of the two terms, aselgeia 
and hubris, marks the centrality of the dispositions they identify.52 They are not acts, but 
attributes, of which Meidias makes use in his dealings with everyone, as stated in the following 
relative clause (ᾗ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀεὶ χρῆται Μειδίας). The topic is hubris as a disposition of 
Meidias, manifested in his actions towards everyone. The other element here highlighted is that 
the judges, as Athenian citizens, are the audience of Meidias’ hubris – his conduct is hubris 
because it has been identified as such by the community. Only once Meidias’ hubris is 
established as a disposition recognized by all does Demosthenes introduce himself, in the 
                                               
48 Fisher (1992) 148. 
49 Cairns (1993, 15-18 and passim; 2011, 30) stresses, in his discussion of aidôs, that the audience could be an 
actual audience as well as a fully internalized (eidetic) audience, as imagined by the actor. This is clearly correct. 
In the case of a charge of hubris, on the other hand, the relevant audience is always an actual audience: the 
Athenians, and more specifically the judges in the lawcourt as the representatives of the Athenians more widely, 
adjudicate on whether the agent’s act discredits the agent or the patient. 
50 Harris (1989); (1992); (2008) 79-81; (forthcoming). Contra MacDowell (1990) 13-23; (2009) 247, 252, followed 
by Fisher (1992) 36-85; Rowe (1995); Martin (2009) 15-48 (at p. 48 he claims the charge is asebeia); Worthington 
(2012) 158-62; Scullion (2012) 222-31; Eidinow (2015) 74-75. In any case, even if we were to accept that the 
charge was, in its entirety, a probolê brought for offences committed during the festival, it is clear that 
Demosthenes argues in the speech that these offences constitute hubris and could be prosecuted through a graphê 
hubreôs – my argument in the following does not depend specifically on the kind of charge brought, but rather on 
the conceptualization of hubris as a legal offence punishable in court. 
51 For a discussion of the structure of the speech and the relevance of the arguments see Harris 2008: 82-4. See 
also MacDowell (1990) 28-37, who, however, considers many of the arguments irrelevant to the charge because 
he believes the charge to be a probolê. 
52 Aselgeia is normally a general attribute of the subject and not a specific act: cf. Dem. 4.9. 
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second sentence, as the victim of one manifestation of Meidias’ hubris (ἐγὼ δ᾽ … ὑβρισθεὶς), 
the reason why he is bringing the charge. Of the elements that characterize Meidias as guilty 
of hubris, Demosthenes prioritizes his hybristic disposition, the fact that this disposition 
manifests itself all the time in all his social interactions (and at 4 the aim of the charge is that 
Meidias should no longer be able to behave with hubris without fear) and that the Athenian 
citizens as the audience of his behaviour already consider it hubris (this is strengthened by the 
vivid description at 2 of the Athenians’ rage against Meidias at the probolê in the Assembly, 
cf. 6; and at 4 by the mention of the widespread support for Demosthenes’ charge against him).  
The specific actions against Demosthenes (the blow etc.) are cited as the reasons why 
Demosthenes charged Meidias, not as the reasons for Meidias’ guilt. Meidias’ disposition, 
apparent in all occasions against everyone, is stressed again at 7: Demosthenes asks the judges 
to cast their vote in his favour (‘to help me as well as yourself’) ‘if I prove that Meidias here 
has behaved with hubris not only towards me but also towards you, the laws and everyone 
else’. The arrangement of the sentence suggests that what Demosthenes needs to prove to win 
the trial, by his own admission, is not only that he was the victim of acts of hubris, but that 
Meidias was more generally hybristic in all of his social and political dealings. He then 
summarizes the situation from which the trial originated as follows: ‘This is roughly how 
matters stand, men of Athens: in the past I have been subjected to hubris, and my person to 
physical abuse.’ But he immediately clarifies that this is not what the judges need to vote about: 
‘But the issue that is about to be decided is whether or not someone should be allowed to 
behave with hubris with impunity towards anyone whom he encounters.’ The two clauses are 
connected by μὲν… δέ, marking an opposition between ‘the situation’ (οὕτω πως ἔχει: the 
actions against Demosthenes) and the issue to be decided (τὸ πρᾶγμα νυνί: Meidias’ hubris 
as manifested in his general conduct). This is confirmed by the next sentence at 8, where 
Demosthenes asserts (against Meidias’ protestations, cf. 25-41) that the trial is not about a 
private matter, but about whether such behaviour is more generally acceptable (this point is 
expanded upon at 25-76). The focus in these key introductory paragraphs is not on 
Demosthenes as victim, and there is no mention of his dishonour, which, in Fisher’s reading, 
should be central to the charge. 
After discussing his use of probolê at 8-12, Demosthenes turns to a long discussion of 
Meidias’ actions as manifestation of his hubris. First he deals with his actions in connection 
with the Dionysia (12-18), showing that the blow was not an isolated occurrence, but consistent 
with his previous behaviour towards Demosthenes acting as chorus producer. Demosthenes 
stresses at 15 that what makes the individual actions of Meidias against himself actionable 
through a graphê hubreôs (i.e. formally hybristic) is not his own reaction to or his own 
assessment of them, however much anger (or humiliation) he may have felt, but the assessment 
of the audience of the Athenians. He therefore promises to discuss with the judges ‘actions that 
will make all of you [the judges] equally angry’. The description of these actions (16-18) is 
punctuated by claims that the Athenians, as bystanders and at the probolê in the Assembly, are 
already convinced that they are manifestations of hubris. 
The rest of the argument is anticipated at 19-24: Demosthenes will go through all the other 
instances of hubris in Meidias’ behaviour, to show that his actions at the Dionysia are 
manifestations of a more general disposition and conduct. At 21 Demosthenes states that the 
judges need to punish Meidias for all of these actions, and anticipates that he will discuss them 
concentrating first on his hybristic behaviour towards himself and then on that towards other 
Athenians. The topic is here admittedly a series of individual acts, but presented from the point 
of view of Meidias’ behaviour, inasmuch as they are manifestations of a disposition. The 
victims of the actions of Meidias (23: ὕβρεις αὐτοῦ) are cited here not to stress their dishonour 
and humiliation, but as evidence of the actions. Even the word atimia, in the plural (ἀτιμίας), 
qualified, like ὕβρεις, by αὐτοῦ (Meidias’), is used in a way that stresses not the status of the 
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victims as a result of Meidias’ actions, but Meidias’ disrespectful behaviour, which fails to 
respect the timê they lay claim to.53 As timê can refer in Greek both to one’s worth and status 
and to the external recognition of this worth and status by others (their respect or the markers 
of this respect), atimia can refer both to one’s lack of honour as worth, status and prerogatives, 
and to actions and behaviour by others that deny one’s worth and status. We should not assume 
that the external lack of respect for one’s claims to timê automatically corresponds to actual 
lack of timê as worth.54 Here the use of atimiai (like the use of ὕβρεις) focuses on Meidias’ 
behaviour (as clarified by αὐτοῦ), but does not comment on its effects. 
Demosthenes fulfils the promises made in these paragraphs at 77-127, where he discusses 
various instances of Meidias’ hubris that involved himself, and at 128-42, where he moves to 
hubris that involved others. I shall give a few examples of how Demosthenes goes through 
these actions focusing on them as evidence of Meidias’ disposition. At 77 he states that his 
actions would be understandable (and therefore not hybristic) if they were intended as 
repayment (retaliation) for something that happened in the past.55 But Demosthenes intends to 
show that Meidias’ behaviour towards him has always been hybristic – it does not stem from 
particular motives, but from his hybristic disposition (cf. 109). And, once again, he stresses that 
Meidias’ actions (in the context of Demosthenes’ suits against his guardians) are well known 
to the Athenians, had a wide audience at the time and were already deemed by the Athenians 
to be hybristic (80). The impression of Meidias’ hybristic disposition is reinforced by tales of 
him ignoring the laws and court judgements against him, and behaving with hubris not only 
against Demosthenes but also against his entire tribe (81, 108). His hubris is connected to his 
wealth and high social standing (98, 100, 109, 123, 138, 185), in accordance with common 
beliefs about the causes of a hybristic disposition.56 His wealth and standing make him believe 
he is superior to everyone else, above the laws (112-13), they lead him therefore to overestimate 
his claim to timê and therefore his prerogatives vis à vis others, the laws and the polis. The 
picture of his disposition is reinforced through discussion of his sacrilegious behaviour and his 
shamelessness (104-05, 109, 119-20). Demosthenes stresses repeatedly that Meidias’ 
behaviour should cause (and has caused) the anger of all Athenians, a clear mark of hubris 
(108). At 114 he describes the implications of his narrative of Meidias’ actions in terms of the 
disposition they manifest: ‘This man is so impious, so foul, so ready to stoop to say or do 
anything—whether it be true or false, against an enemy or a friend, and so on, he makes no 
distinction at all …’ And at 115, after showing that it was not out of any actual motive or 
                                               
53 For the word order, cf. Dem. 18.50: αἴτιος δ’ οὗτος, ὥσπερ ἑωλοκρασίαν τινά μου τῆς πονηρίας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ 
καὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων κατασκεδάσας; 18.252: τὴν ἀγνωμοσύνην αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν βασκανίαν; Thuc. 2.13.1: 
τοὺς δὲ ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οἰκίας; Plut. Mar. 31.3: τὴν δύναμιν αὑτοῦ καὶ τὴν δόξαν οἰόμενος; 34.6: 
τὴν φιλοτιμίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἁμίλλας. 
54 See Van Wees (1992) 69–77; Cairns (2011) 29–30 and passim; Rabbås (2015) 632-34; Canevaro (2013) 187-88 
on the semantic range of timê. That atimia also includes both aspects is shown by passages such as Eur. Her. 72: 
the expression θεῶν ἀτιμία cannot refer to an actual loss of status of the gods as a result of the mortals’ behaviour, 
but rather to the mortals’ lack of respect for the gods’ claims to timê. Other passages use atimia primarily in 
reference to external recognition (or markers of recognition), with no automatic reference to internal worth or 
actual status (the loss of status and worth could be a consequence, but is not flagged up as an automatic 
consequence): e.g. Arist. Rhet. 1374a 23, where ἀτιμίαι are mentioned alongside ὀνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι … καὶ 
τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί, all forms of external recognition (notice that Aristotle does not normally use timê to signify 
one’s worth or status, only the external recognition of this worth: see Rabbås (2015) 632-34). In most instances, 
the two aspects of atimia are naturally aligned: the lack of respect for one’s claims to timê corresponds to one’s 
actual dishonour. But the purpose of an accusation of hubris, from the point of view of the victim, is precisely to 
deny any alignment between the perpetrator’s lack of respect and the victim’s actual status, see this section, below. 
55 Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1378b 25-26: οἱ γὰρ ἀντιποιοῦντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται. 
56 See Dover (1974) 110-11; MacDowell (1976) 16-17; Fisher (1992) 19-21, 48-50, 69-72, 296-97, 349-52, 421-
22 for the connection between hubris and wealth, youth and over-confidence. See e.g. Arist. Rhet. 1383a 1-3; 
1385b 19-23; 1389a 13-16 and Eur. Supp. 726-30, 737-44; fr. 438 Kannicht; Xen. Cyr. 8.4. 
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conviction that Meidias tried to expel Demosthenes from the country, he concludes that he did 
it ‘out of hubris’ – hubris, as a disposition, is identified as the real cause of his behaviour. This 
point is further reinforced at 123, where Meidias’ plotting is described as an ἔθος, a habit (in 
turn linked again to his wealth) which is recurrent and must be resented with anger and 
indignation not only by the victim of the day, but by all the Athenians, because hubris manifests 
itself towards everyone, towards the laws, the god and the polis (126-27). The job of the 
Athenians is to sanction hubris when they see it, and publicly deter those that develop this 
disposition on account of their wealth (123). At 128 Demosthenes once again states that if such 
actions had been directed only against him, and Meidias’ general disposition had turned out to 
be that of a φιλάνθρωπος, he would have considered them to be his misfortune – the hubris 
of the acts against him can only be ascertained as an episode of a general disposition, for the 
court to condemn Meidias of hubris. Paragraphs 128-40 have the declared purpose of showing 
that Meidias is hybristic in all of his dealings and social interactions, and 138 again summarizes 
his behaviour with reference to his disposition as a result of his wealth: ‘When a man’s evil 
and hybristic nature is supported by power and wealth, this acts as a bulwark protecting against 
sudden attack. Should he be stripped of his possessions, he would perhaps not behave with 
hubris.’ 
In the narrative of Meidias’ actions throughout his life and career, the focus is always on 
Meidias, on the coherence of his hybristic conduct and on the disposition of which this is a 
manifestation.57 Demosthenes makes clear that these are the key elements that need proving to 
secure Meidias’ conviction in the graphê hubreôs. And, accordingly, the arguments that 
Demosthenes anticipates Meidias will use (25-41) are all about the fact that his actions are at 
best individual offences against Demosthenes, which Demosthenes should have prosecuted 
through private actions and not through a graphê hubreôs. These objections are not just 
procedural, they are substantive: by claiming that these are individual private offences, Meidias 
denies that they are the manifestation of a general disposition and therefore attempts to 
demonstrate that his behaviour does not qualify as hubris. Demosthenes’ counterargument 
starts with a strong statement that Meidias has clearly committed the acts of which he is accused 
‘out of hubris’ (ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁπηνίκα καὶ πεποιηκὼς ἃ κατηγορῶ καὶ ὕβρει πεποιηκὼς 
φαίνεται). Meidias argues that he may have committed the actions of which he is accused, but 
there is no hybristic disposition involved. Demosthenes replies that the actions are clearly due 
to Meidias’ hybristic disposition. That is the clincher in a graphê hubreôs.  
 
4. The victim of hubris in the graphê hubreôs 
 
What about the victims, then? What is the victims’ place in the argument that hubris has been 
committed? Demosthenes in the Against Meidias goes so far as to limit the importance of the 
victim and to claim that those who behave with hubris wrong the entire city, not just the victim 
– this is the reason why the graphê hubreôs is a public charge (45). In the next few paragraphs, 
in introducing the issue of hubris against slaves, he takes the victim altogether out of the 
equation (as we shall see in the section 5). Demosthenes hardly ever focuses on the emotions 
of the victims of hubris and on their dishonour as a result of Meidias’ hubris towards them. 
There are only three possible exceptions to this pattern, which need to be discussed. It will 
become clear that the relationship between hubris and the dishonour of the victim is not as 
straightforward as normally assumed. 
The most important evidence for the effects of hubris on the victim is 72-74, in which 
Demosthenes narrates the story of Euaeon and Boeotus. Boeotus struck Euaeon at a dinner 
                                               
57 MacDowell (1990) 21-22 saw this, but believed that all these arguments, relevant to a charge of hubris, were 
irrelevant to this particular charge, a probolê (pp. 30-1). 
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party with one single blow and Euaeon killed him in retaliation. These facts are narrated by 
Demosthenes, against Meidias’ arguments that theirs is a private quarrel of little importance. 
Demosthenes wants to show that his lack of immediate retaliation to the blow in the theatre is 
not a sign that Meidias’ actions were not serious, that people behaving with hubris, like 
Meidias, have incurred serious consequences in the past, and that Demosthenes is therefore not 
overreacting by bringing a graphê hubreôs. As a result, the focus is admittedly on the reaction 
of the victim of hubris and on his motivations. Fisher takes this passage to be clear evidence 
that hubris has primarily to do with the effects (the dishonour) that an action brings to the 
victim: ‘it is the feeling of being shamed, dishonoured, humiliated that Demosthenes brings 
out’.58 It is worth quoting the passage in full:59 
 
Many people know Euaeon, the brother of Leodamas, who killed Boeotus at a banquet, a public gathering, 
because of a single blow. [72] It was not the blow that aroused his anger, but the atimia. Being beaten is 
not what is terrible for free men (although it is terrible), but being beaten out of hubris. A man who strikes 
may do many things, men of Athens, some of which the victim may not even be able to describe to someone 
else: the way he stands, the way he looks, his tone of voice, when he displays hubris, when he acts like an 
enemy, when he punches, when he strikes him in the face. When men are not used to being insulted, this 
is what stirs them up, this is what drives them to distraction. No one, men of Athens, could by reporting 
these actions convey to his audience their seriousness in the exact way that the hubris really and truly 
appears to the victim of the act and those who witness it. [73] Consider, by Zeus and the gods, men of 
Athens, think and calculate in your own mind how much more anger I was likely to have felt when Meidias 
did things like this than Euaeon did then, the man who killed Boeotus. He was struck by an acquaintance, 
and that man was drunk, in front of six or seven men, and those men were acquaintances who were going 
to blame one man for what he did and praise the other for holding back and restraining himself. Besides, 
this happened when he went to a house for dinner, a place where he did not have to go. [74] I, on the other 
hand, was subjected to hubris at the hands of an enemy who was sober, in the morning, acting out of hubris 
and not under the influence of wine, in front of many people, both foreigners and citizens, and this 
happened in a shrine where as a chorus leader, I was under a strong obligation to go. Because of good sense 
or rather good fortune, I think, men of Athens, I decided to hold back and not get carried away to do any 
irreparable damage; but I have much sympathy for Euaeon and all men if someone has been the victim of 
atimia and has come to his own rescue. (Dem. 21.71-74)60 
 
There are two key features of this passage that complicate the picture drawn by Fisher. First, 
although it is clear that 72 focuses on the effects of hubristic behaviour on the victim (drawing 
a parallel with Demosthenes’ lack of immediate reaction, but later choice of bringing a graphê 
                                               
58 Fisher (1992) 47-49. See also Harris (2008) 83, who also stresses the humiliation felt by Demosthenes. 
59 [71] ἴσασιν Εὐαίωνα πολλοὶ τὸν Λεωδάμαντος ἀδελφόν, ἀποκτείναντα Βοιωτὸν ἐν δείπνῳ καὶ συνόδῳ 
κοινῇ διὰ πληγὴν μίαν. [72] οὐ γὰρ ἡ πληγὴ παρέστησε τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἀτιμία: οὐδὲ τὸ τύπτεσθαι τοῖς 
ἐλευθέροις ἐστὶ δεινόν, καίπερ ὂν δεινόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐφ᾽ ὕβρει. πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιήσειεν ὁ τύπτων, ὦ ἄνδρες 
Ἀθηναῖοι, ὧν ὁ παθὼν ἔνι᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀπαγγεῖλαι δύναιθ᾽ ἑτέρῳ, τῷ σχήματι, τῷ βλέμματι, τῇ φωνῇ, ὅταν 
ὡς ὑβρίζων, ὅταν ὡς ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων, ὅταν κονδύλοις, ὅταν ἐπὶ κόρρης. ταῦτα κινεῖ, ταῦτ᾽ ἐξίστησιν 
ἀνθρώπους αὑτῶν, ἀήθεις ὄντας τοῦ προπηλακίζεσθαι. οὐδεὶς ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῦτ᾽ 
ἀπαγγέλλων δύναιτο τὸ δεινὸν παραστῆσαι τοῖς ἀκούουσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τοῦ 
πράγματος τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ τοῖς ὁρῶσιν ἐναργὴς ἡ ὕβρις φαίνεται. [73] σκέψασθε δὴ πρὸς Διὸς καὶ 
θεῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ λογίσασθε παρ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, ὅσῳ πλείον᾽ ὀργὴν ἐμοὶ προσῆκε παραστῆναι 
πάσχοντι τοιαῦθ᾽ ὑπὸ Μειδίου ἢ τότ᾽ ἐκείνῳ τῷ Εὐαίωνι τῷ τὸν Βοιωτὸν ἀποκτείναντι. ὁ μέν γ᾽ ὑπὸ 
γνωρίμου, καὶ τούτου μεθύοντος, ἐναντίον ἓξ ἢ ἕπτ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἐπλήγη, καὶ τούτων γνωρίμων, οἳ τὸν 
μὲν κακιεῖν οἷς ἔπραξε, τὸν δ᾽ ἐπαινέσεσθαι μετὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀνασχόμενον καὶ κατασχόνθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἔμελλον, 
καὶ ταῦτ᾽ εἰς οἰκίαν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, οἷ μηδὲ βαδίζειν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· [74] ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἐχθροῦ, νήφοντος, 
ἕωθεν, ὕβρει καὶ οὐκ οἴνῳ τοῦτο ποιοῦντος, ἐναντίον πολλῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ πολιτῶν ὑβριζόμην, καὶ 
ταῦτ᾽ ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ οἷ πολλή μοι ἦν ἀνάγκη βαδίζειν χορηγοῦντι. καὶ ἐμαυτὸν μέν γ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 
σωφτιμαζρόνως, μᾶλλον δ᾽ εὐτυχῶς οἶμαι βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἀνασχόμενον τότε καὶ οὐδὲν ἀνήκεστον 
ἐξαχθέντα πρᾶξαι· τῷ δ᾽ Εὐαίωνι καὶ πᾶσιν, εἴ τις αὑτῷ βεβοήθηκεν ἀτιμαζόμενος, πολλὴν συγγνώμην 
ἔχω. 
60 I avoid translating words stemming from hubris or atimia in order not to prejudge the interpretation of the 
passage. 
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hubreôs), the effect on the victim, according to the wording, is anger (τὴν ὀργήν), not ἀτιμία. 
ἀτιμία is rather the real cause (as opposed to the blow) of the anger of the victim. Thus, strictly 
speaking, this sentence does not identify ἀτιμία as the effect of hubris on the victim; it 
identifies ἀτιμία as the cause of the anger of the victim. It is Fisher’s extrapolation that ἀτιμία 
is in turn one of the effects (the key effect) of hubris on the victim (rather than a feature of the 
hubris of the agent). As I observed in Section 3, at 23 of this speech atimia is matched to hubris 
to indicate the behaviour of the perpetrator (his lack of respect for the victim’s claims to timê), 
but it does not necessarily imply a corresponding effect on the victim (his loss of status or 
timê). In fact, while in most cases the word atimia (used not in its legal sense) indicates, 
concurrently, both the external manifestations of disrespect for one’s claims to timê and one’s 
matching dishonour as loss of timê,61 in cases of accusations of hubris the alignment between 
these two aspects is precisely what is denied by the accuser. The accuser argues that he has 
been the victim of hubris and therefore that his claims to timê have been disrespected (atimia), 
but does not admit to any actual dishonour as loss of status. For instance, when a victim, a free 
man, claims to have been treated as a slave by a hubristês, he is certainly not accepting that, as 
a result of this treatment, he has become a slave – quite the contrary! At 180 Demosthenes 
states that hubris is the reason for which Ctesicles, at a procession, struck an enemy with his 
whip, thus treating free men as if they were slaves. What the victim wanted to demonstrate by 
having this behaviour sanctioned as hubris was precisely the misalignment between how he 
had been treated (the lack of respect for his claims to timê) and his actual timê as worth or 
status. Likewise, when the enemies of Apollodorus sent a free boy to his rose-garden in the 
hope that Apollodorus, convinced that he was a slave, would maltreat him, triggering therefore 
a graphê hubreôs ([Dem.] 53.16), the key to the ploy was the misalignment between the boy’s 
status and Apollodorus’ treatment as if he were of inferior status. The ploy presupposed that 
Apollodorus’ disrespectful treatment would not alter the boy’s claim to respect – hence the 
hubris.62 
There is therefore no reason for reading atimia at 72 as a direct reference to objective loss 
of timê by the victim, resulting from hubris, as Fisher does. The passage makes perfect sense 
in reference to Boeotus’s behaviour: it was not Boeotus’ blow that caused Euaeon’s anger, but 
his lack of respect for his claims to timê (ἀτιμία). The parallelism built in the sentence in fact 
supports this interpretation, otherwise we need to postulate that the two subjects, ἡ πληγή and 
ἡ ἀτιμία, refer to different characters: the blow is Boeotus’, but the ἀτιμία is Euaeon’s. This 
is not impossible, but we need to recognize that, although the mention of ἀτιμία here is clearly 
meant to explain what is distinctive about acts of hubris (the next sentence reiterates that the 
blow is terrible for a free man only when struck out of hubris, thus connecting atimia with 
hubris), it does not necessarily follow that what is distinctive is the dishonour of the victim, 
and not the behaviour of the perpetrator.63 This is further confirmed by 74, where Euaeon is 
described as victim of atimia with the verb ἀτιμαζόμενος – the (passive) verb is in the present, 
which focuses the description on the process of being the victim of disrespectful behaviour 
                                               
61 See Section 3 above. 
62 The paradigmatic case of this dynamic is the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon in the Iliad: Achilles 
laments that Agamemnon has disrespected him (Hom. Il. 1.356: ἠτίμησεν) and represents his behaviour as 
hybristic (Hom. Il. 1.203, 214). When Achilles claims that Agamemnon treated him like a dishonoured vagrant 
(Hom. Il. 9.648: ὡς εἴ τιν᾽ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην), he is not saying that as a result of Agamemnon’s disrespectful 
behaviour (ἠτίμησεν) he has actually become a dishonoured vagrant (he claims in fact that his timê comes from 
Zeus, and he does not need the timê granted by the Achaeans, Hom. Il. 9.607-08). It is precisely because Achilles 
is most definitely not a dishonoured vagrant that Agamemnon’s disrespect towards him qualifies as hybristic. See 
Cairns (2001) 211-14 and (2011) 32-33 on this quarrel and the interplay of honour and communal norms. 
63 Cf. Ober (1996) 99-101, who, because he sees honour as a scarce non-material commodity pursued through a 
zero-sum competition between two actors, assumes that atimia, here and elsewhere, implies automatically loss of 
status for the victim of hubris. 
 15 
(and therefore on the disrespectful behaviour of the perpetrator), rather than on the actual 
effects (in terms of timê and status) of this behaviour on the victim (this would have required 
an aorist). And the following sentences are in fact all about the behaviour and the attitude of 
the perpetrator: ‘the way he stands, the way he looks, his tone of voice …’.64 After describing 
this behaviour and attitude, Demosthenes reiterates that these are the causes of the victim’s 
anger (ταῦτα κινεῖ, ταῦτ᾽ ἐξίστησιν ἀνθρώπους αὑτῶν). 
As in the rest of the speech, so in this passage the focus, when describing what constitutes 
hubris, is the attitude and the behaviour of the perpetrator, not the dishonour of the victim. And 
at the end of 72 we find the other key element to the identification of hubris, as we have 
described it in the previous section: the reaction of the audience, in this case the bystanders. 
The introduction of the audience leads us to the second complicating feature of the passage: 
that the action of Boeotus cannot in fact be unambiguously defined as hubris, or considered as 
an actual insult to Euaeon. Demosthenes pushes the parallel with Meidias’ action at 72, but at 
73 introduces elements that suggest that Euaeon’s interpretation of the action as hubris, and 
therefore his reaction, were perhaps excessive: Boeotus was drunk and being drunk is often 
flagged up as a justification for inappropriate behaviour that does not, however, derive from a 
hybristic disposition. At 74 Demosthenes in fact opposes drunkenness, as a motivation, to 
hubris, and so he does at 180 (‘[Ctesicles] struck his enemy out of hubris, not because of the 
wine, and he took the procession and the drinking as his excuse and committed the offence, 
treating free men as slaves’). At 38 drunkenness (together with passion and ignorance) is the 
reason why the actions of the man who struck the thesmotetês were judged not to be hybristic. 
That Boeotus’ blow was not in fact believed by a majority of Athenians to derive from a 
hybristic disposition, and therefore did not justify the extreme anger of Euaeon (it was not that 
serious an insult), is also signalled by the fact that Euaeon was taken to court and sentenced to 
death for his reaction, even though by only one vote (75).65  
This passage therefore does not show that the dishonour of the victim was central to the 
demonstration that hubris had been committed. First, there is no compelling reason to read in 
the description of the hybristic act and its effects any reference to actual dishonour or 
humiliation of the victim, as loss of timê, status or standing in the eyes of the audience; that is, 
the hybristic action did not diminish the victim’s standing in the eyes of the onlookers. Second, 
the case discussed by Demosthenes turns out not even to be an uncontroversial case of insulting 
behaviour, and had not been uncontroversially seen as such by the community as its audience, 
in court and outside.66 We find similar problems with the lengthy description of Strato’s fate 
following his adjudication against Meidias, when Meidias failed to show up at an arbitration 
for a charge of slander brought by Demosthenes (3-101). This is not the place to reconstruct 
the series of legal proceedings that led to his fate, but there is no question that in this case, as a 
result of Meidias’ actions, Strato suffered actual dishonour, actualized by a lawcourt in a 
penalty of legal atimia (as disenfranchisement).67 Thus, atimia in this instance is not just the 
perpetrator’s lack of respect for the victim’s claims to timê, but the victim’s humiliation and 
dishonour. This, however, does not make the connection between hubris and dishonour in this 
case any more straightforward. Demosthenes, in the context of his review of Meidias’ hybristic 
behaviour, repeatedly describes Meidias’ actions against Strato as hybristic, originating from 
                                               
64 MacDowell (1990) 21 saw this when he noted that ‘this passage stresses the effect of hubris on the victim, but 
it stresses even more the attitude of the attacker’. 
65 On this particular trial and the procedure and charge see Harris (1992) 78; (2008) 128. 
66 My interpretation here differs markedly from that offered in Ober (1996) 98-9, who sees this story (as well as 
that of Euthynus and Sophilus) as ‘a tale of justifiable revenge … executed in order to redress the atimia associated 
with an act of hubris’. 
67 On atimia as a legal penalty in Classical Athens, see MacDowell (1978) 73-75; Vlemick (1981); Todd (1993) 
116-18, 142-43; Kamen (2013) 71-78 (with further bibliography). 
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the same hybristic disposition which resulted in all of Meidias’ other acts. What he obscures, 
however, is the other element of the equation (central to all of his other descriptions of hybristic 
acts): the judgement of the community of the Athenians. And the Athenians, acting in an 
institutional capacity, had clearly not considered at the time Meidias’ accusations against Strato 
as hybristic, stemming from his inflated sense of his own timê, but rather as fully justified, as 
they had voted in Meidias’ favour against Strato, and inflicted on Strato the penalty of atimia. 
Thus, from an institutional and legal point of view, Strato’s dishonour (atimia) was not the 
result of Meidias’ hubris. It was inflicted on him because Meidias was judged to be in the right. 
If the community of the Athenians, in their institutions, had deemed Meidias to be behaving 
hybristically, then Strato would not have become atimos. 
This same dynamic is alluded to already at 6, when Demosthenes quickly acknowledges the 
ambiguity of the position of the victim of hubris who brings a charge against the hubristês: he 
claims that his condition resembles that of the defendant at a trial, because it is kind of a 
misfortune (τις συμφορά) to be the victim of hubris and not to receive justice for it. This 
statement can be better understood in the light of what has been observed so far. Because it is 
up to the audience (actual or not) of an act to decide whether the act stems from an unwarranted 
over-statement of one’s worth and status (timê), and therefore is an act of hubris, if the audience 
(in such a case the judges in a lawcourt) were to decide that there is no hubris, this would 
equate to certifying that the timê the agent has arrogated to himself, and the effects of this on 
his behaviour (and therefore on others), are in fact appropriate. When the acts of hubris 
contested in court are towards a victim with significant status (timê, e.g. a citizen), such as 
Demosthenes, then the victim is indeed in a difficult position: were the judges, representing 
formally the community as the audience of the act of hubris, to decide that no hubris had been 
committed, their decision would ‘formalize’ and ‘actualize’ not only the expansive timê 
arrogated by Meidias, but also his disregard for Demosthenes’s timê. His lack of respect for 
Demosthenes’ claims to timê (atimia as the behaviour of the agent) would be formalized by the 
court as reflecting the actual atimia of Demosthenes (as actual lack of timê as worth). The 
paradox here is that, strictly speaking, where there is atimia as lack of worth, there is no actual 
lack of respect, and therefore no hubris has been committed. Conversely, if the court decides 
that hubris, as lack of respect for the victim’s claims to timê, has been committed, this 
concurrently certifies that the victim is in fact worthy of respect, that he possesses the timê he 
lays claim to.68 
The neat scheme I have laid out here works at the level of the Athenians’ conceptualization 
of the workings of timê and hubris, at the level of the abstraction of the law, and therefore in 
the context of the judicial sanctioning of hubris (at this level either something is deemed to be 
hubris, or it is not), but if we take into account the emotional effects of hubris, and the nuances 
introduced by any real life social interaction, then everything becomes of course more blurred. 
Any act of disrespect for one’s claims to timê will cause anxiety in the victim as to whether the 
disrespect is justified (and considered justified by the reference audience, imagined or 
                                               
68 Aristotle’s definitions of hubris in the Rhetoric (1378b 29-30: ὕβρεως δὲ ἀτιμία, ὁ δ᾽ ἀτιμάζων ὀλιγωρεῖ) 
should be read as referring primarily to the agent and his behaviour (as indicated by ὁ ἀτιμάζων, in the present), 
not objectively to the worth of the victim (see Section 3 above for this use of atimia), although the worth of the 
victim can of course be affected by the lack of respect for the victim’s claims to timê (atimia) of the hubristês (τὸ 
γὰρ μηδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμήν, οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ), according to the dynamics laid out in 
this section. The definition at 1378b 23-25 (ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἐφ᾽ οἷς αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ 
πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γίγνηται αὑτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅ τι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἡσθῇ) does mention acts that may cause 
αἰσχύνη in the victim (and αἰσχύνη can mean either disgrace or a feeling of shame). Note, however, that the 
formulation here falls within the description of the pathos of anger, whose cause, hubris, is characterized as a kind 
of oligôria – it is entirely focalised on the agent and on his motivations, which explicitly entail nothing beyond 
the pleasure found in the performance itself. This formulation says nothing of the actual effects of hubris on the 
victim. On these passages see Cairns (1996) 1-8. 
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otherwise) and therefore reflects objective dishonour, actual lack of worth mirrored in the 
judgment of the person who disrespects and of the audience of the act. This grey area of anxiety 
and doubt means that hybristic acts do actually produce fear of dishonour and therefore some 
level of shame, unless an unambiguous statement that these acts are hybristic can be secured 
from an actual audience (and even then some anxiety may still linger).69 This is exactly what 
the graphê hubreôs is meant to provide, but, as I have observed, at the risk of having, 
potentially, the opposite formally sanctioned, viz. the lack of hubris of the agent and therefore 
the actual dishonour of the victim. 
The complex dynamic I have described comes to the fore also at 106, where Demosthenes, 
after the narrative of the many acts of hubris towards himself through the years, affirms 
metaphorically that Meidias, because of these repeated acts of hubris, has become 
Demosthenes’ murderer (αὐτόχειρ), viz. his ruin. This seems to suggest that Meidias’ actions 
have had the consequence of destroying Demosthenes, but it is soon clear that this is not exactly 
what Demosthenes means. Meidias has behaved hybristically towards Demosthenes’ 
preparations, body and expenditures at the Dionysia, and in the past (in the actions narrated 
since 77 and again at 110-11) had behaved hybristically towards everything else – 
Demosthenes’ city, family, epitimia (his prerogatives), hopes. But the damage evoked is only 
potential, never actualized: it is lack of respect for Demosthenes’ prerogatives, identity and 
relations that would have destroyed Demosthenes’ timê (as worth and claim to respect) if 
Meidias had been successful (εἰ γὰρ ἓν ὧν ἐπεβούλευσε κατώρθωσεν). But Meidias never 
was, because, as Demosthenes has narrated in the previous paragraphs, the Athenians saw 
through his actions and identified them for what they were: manifestations of hubris. Once 
again, Demosthenes does not admit to losing any honour or status (to being humiliated) as a 
result of Meidias’ actions, precisely because these actions have always been judged by the 
Athenians to be hybristic, the result of his hybristic disposition. 
Because of this dynamic, the priority of the dispositional aspect of hubris, not only in how 
the notion was generally conceptualized (as explored by Cairns), but also in the arguments used 
in an actual case of graphê hubreôs, makes perfect sense. Proving that an act was hybristic 
depended on establishing that the perpetrator was characterized by hubris as a disposition, 
which affected all of his conduct. Only if this could be proved, could the particular act(s) 
contested in court then be judged to be hybristic. The arbiter of the hybristic disposition, and 
of the hybristic acts that resulted from it, was the community, making an assessment within 
and outside the courts. Within this framework, as Demosthenes states at 46, the victim is almost 
irrelevant to the determination of hubris, and therefore acts can be judged as resulting from 
hubris even if the specific victim has no claim, vis-à-vis the community of the Athenians, to 
timê – this is how the Athenians conceptualized hubris against slaves, as I shall show in the 
next section. But when the victim had actual claims to timê, as Demosthenes did, then the 
situation became more complicated, because hybristic behaviour that asserts the timê of the 
hubristês beyond what is appropriate (epitêdeios) can result in disrespecting the legitimate 
claims of others.70 By bringing such disrespect against himself to the attention of the judges, 
Demosthenes ran a risk: the decision of the judges on whether Meidias was characterized by 
hubris and had acted accordingly had implications for Demosthenes’ own timê, because a 
decision of not guilty would have meant that Meidias’ disrespecting of Demosthenes was 
judged to be appropriate, and therefore that Demosthenes’ claims to respect were unfounded. 
This is why, throughout the speech as well as at the very beginning of it, before even 
                                               
69 See now Fussi (2018) 141-46 for a discussion of the differences between humiliation and shame, and of how 
humiliation, even if considered unjustified by the victim, can still cause shame because of the possible 
(unfathomable) reactions of the public and society to it, and therefore of its consequences. 
70 Cairns (1996) 8-17, 32. 
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introducing himself as a victim, Demosthenes stresses the hybristic disposition of Meidias, the 
fact that this resulted in hybristic behaviour towards everyone, not just himself (cf. 7), and that 
the judges and all the citizens knew already of Meidias’ hubris. Bringing this charge for acts 
of hubris against himself put his own timê on the line, and its preservation depended on 
establishing Meidias’ more general hybristic disposition as recognized by the judges and the 
community. 
 
4. Conclusion: hubris against slaves the role of the graphê hubreôs in Athenian society 
 
I have shown in this article, from the analysis of the only extant speech delivered in a graphê 
hubreôs (Dem. 21), that although hubris as prosecuted in judicial settings obviously manifested 
itself in specific acts and had a victim, the accuser, in order to prove the charge, did not focus 
on the action itself or on its effects on the victim (or on the victim’s emotional response). He 
needed to prove that the act was only an episode of a more general hybristic conduct and the 
manifestation of a hybristic disposition, recognized as such by a wide audience of Athenians 
in many circumstances. The primary consideration in the charge was therefore the disposition 
of the perpetrator vis-à-vis the assessment of the community, and not the dishonour of the 
victim. Hubris was therefore conceptualized, as demonstrated by Cairns and confirmed by this 
analysis, as the agent’s excessive self-assertion, as the overestimation of his claims to timê, 
which led him to arrogate to himself prerogatives that the community had not recognized in 
him, and was not willing to recognize. Because the overestimation of one’s own claims to timê, 
beyond what is appropriate according to community standards and the community’s 
assessment, has the tendency to clash with others’ claims to timê, acts of hubris often involved 
disrespecting others. But treating others with hubris did not involve any automatic loss of timê 
(as worth or status) for the victim – what a verdict of hubris did in such cases was in fact to 
formalize the misalignment between the treatment to which the hubristês had subjected the 
victim and the victim’s actual timê as worth, status and claim to respect. Thus hubris did not 
involve any simple transfer of timê, understood as a scarce non-material commodity, from the 
victim to the perpetrator. There was also no requirement that the victim should have actual 
claims to timê (recognized by Athenians) for the relevant act to be considered hybristic. All 
that was required was that the act should result from an overestimation of one’s status and 
prerogatives (timê) in defiance of the community’s assessment and of community standards. 
The problems isolated in section 2, which have hampered our understanding of how hubris 
against slaves was conceptualized in Athenian law and Athenian legal discourse, disappear if 
we look at the issue within this framework. The formal recognition by a lawcourt (and 
individually by the Athenian judges) that hubris has been committed against a slave does not 
imply a parallel recognition of the slave’s honour (of his claims to timê), which has been denied 
and ‘stolen’ by the hubristês (as if it were a scarce material commodity). When the victim does 
have claims to timê, a conviction for hubris also has the effect of attesting that these claims 
have been unjustly disrespected by the hubristês, and therefore reaffirms them. But a 
conviction for hubris does not depend on the existence of such claims. It depends on the 
hubristês’ overestimation of his own claims to timê, on his breach of communal standards and 
on the assessment of his behaviour as inappropriate and dishonourable by the Athenian judges. 
Thus a hubristês can be convicted of hubris against a slave without this conviction having any 
bearing on the slave’s timê or status. 
This is exactly how the two passages in which the orators discuss the provision forbidding 
hubris against slaves conceptualize the crime.71 Aeschines discusses this provision in the 
                                               
71 Hyp. fr. 120 and Lyc. 10-11.2 (= Athen. 6.266f–267a) are small fragments and lack full discussions, so nothing 
can be drawn from them, except that the law on hubris included hubris committed against slaves. 
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Against Timarchus (1.17), in a section in which he cites various laws that are evidence of the 
lawgiver’s concern with sexual abuse and prostitution of underage boys. 
 
It may be that someone at first hearing might wonder why on earth this term, slaves, was 
added in the law on hubris. But if you consider it, men of Athens, you will find that it is 
the best provision of all. For the legislator was not concerned about slaves; but because 
he wanted to accustom you to keep far away from hubris on free persons, he added the 
prohibition against behaving with hubris even against slaves. Quite simply, he thought 
that in a democracy, whoever is a hubristês towards anyone at all was not fit to live as a 
fellow citizen.72 (Trans. Carey, modified) 
 
Aeschines denies that the lawgiver intended to protect the slaves.73 He argues that the aim of 
the law is to forbid a particular behaviour altogether. The point is that being a hubristês, 
whoever the victim, is unacceptable in a democracy. Aeschines, in formulating an argument 
that was meant to be palatable to and shared by the judges, explicitly denies that convicting a 
person of hubris against a slave has anything to do with protecting the slave, or with 
recognizing the slave’s claims to timê. The passage also reminds us that the reference audience 
of an act of hubris assessed in a graphê hubreôs was a panel of judges composed exclusively 
of Athenian citizens, all free men, and many of them slave holders. In such an institutional 
context, it is unthinkable that hubris against slaves should be legally conceptualized as 
recognizing the slaves’ absolute claims to timê (which imply absolute prerogatives and rights) 
– we have seen in section 2 that the rules of ownership applying to slaves were so 
comprehensive that there was virtually no limit to a master’s power over them.74 It was 
conceptualized as forbidding self-assertion and overestimation of one’s own timê, which can 
result (but does not have to result) in the denial of the claims of those that actually have claims 
to timê – free persons.75 Because such acts are expressions of a disposition, they are forbidden 
because the disposition is forbidden.  
The same argument, again from the point of view of the free masters, is deployed by Plato 
(Leg. 7.777d) in the context of an exploration of how to avoid revolts and dangers at the hands 
of slaves. Plato states that one way of avoiding these problems is to treat slaves properly, not 
for their sake, but ‘for the sake of ourselves’. And treating them properly consists in not 
committing hubris against them, but rather avoiding injustice towards them even more than we 
avoid it towards our equals. The rationale for this maxim has entirely to do with the disposition 
of the free and the masters (and nothing to do with the timê of the slaves): how one behaves 
when he deals with disempowered inferiors without rights is the ultimate test of one’s 
                                               
72 ἴσως ἂν οὖν τις θαυμάσειεν ἐξαίφνης ἀκούσας, τί δή ποτ᾽ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῷ τῆς ὕβρεως προσεγράφη τοῦτο 
τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ τῶν δούλων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν σκοπῆτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εὑρήσετε ὅτι πάντων ἄριστα ἔχει: 
οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν οἰκετῶν ἐσπούδασεν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενος ὑμᾶς ἐθίσαι πολὺ ἀπέχειν τῆς τῶν 
ἐλευθέρων ὕβρεως, προσέγραψε μηδ᾽ εἰς τοὺς δούλους ὑβρίζειν. ὅλως δὲ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ τὸν εἰς 
ὁντινοῦν ὑβριστήν, τοῦτον οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον ἡγήσατο εἶναι συμπολιτεύεσθαι. 
73 On the use of the motive of the intent of the lawgiver see Johnstone (1999) 25-33; Harris (2013) 201-02; 270-
71; Canevaro (2013a) 239-40. 
74 This does not mean that slaves could not be recognized as having a modicum of timê in particular contexts (see 
Section 4 above), but this recognition was contextual and pertinent to specific ‘honour arenas’ – it could not be 
absolutely recognized in the law, intended to be general and valid forever and in all contexts (see Canevaro 
(2015)). 
75 The argument therefore is not instrumental within the Against Timarchus in the sense that it is determined 
exclusively by the argumentative needs of Aeschines, pace Dover (1978) 38; Fisher (1995) 71-72. It is conditioned 
both by the institutional context (a lawcourt full of free Athenians, whose needs, ideas and preconceptions need 
to be accommodated to make the argument persuasive) and by the argumentative needs. 
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character.76 Likewise, a fragment of Hecataeus of Abdera (FGrH 264 F25 = Diod. Sic. 1.76.6)  
concerned with the ancestral laws of the Egyptians provides a similar rationale to justify the 
provisions on homicide: ‘If someone willfully killed [a free man or] a slave, the laws ordered 
that he be killed, since the Egyptians wished that all men should be prevented from ignoble 
acts not through distinctions of circumstance, but by the consequences of their actions, and 
equally they wished to get men accustomed, in virtue of their concern for slaves, to be even 
less inclined to do any wrong to free men’ (trans. modified from Lang). 
Dem. 21.46-50 has another version of this argument. Demosthenes states that in a charge of 
hubris the identity of the victim is irrelevant (οὐ γὰρ ὅστις ὁ πάσχων ᾤετο δεῖν σκοπεῖν); 
what matters is the nature of the behaviour (τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ ὁποῖόν τι τὸ γιγνόμενον), and hubris 
is unacceptable behaviour, which deserves the judges’ anger whoever the victim. Demosthenes 
then proceeds to describe the prohibition on hubris against slaves as a sign of the philanthrôpia 
of the law – this is a reference to the character of the Athenians, as this character was 
understood to be coherent with that of the laws: the Athenians often describe themselves as 
philanthrôpoi, in particular for their habit, in international relations, of helping the weak while 
not having any obligation to do so. While philanthrôpia does suggest a recognition of the 
slave’s humanity,77 it does not imply any obligation following from this recognition, and 
therefore any timê of the slave.78 Dem. 24.51-2 makes the implications of philanthrôpia very 
clear in discussing the law on supplications, which prevents those that have been convicted in 
court, or anyone else on their behalf, from making supplications in the Council or the 
Assembly: he states that the lawgiver enacted this prohibition because he was aware of the 
Athenians’ philanthrôpia, which has often damaged their interests, and wanted to prevent 
wrongdoers from taking advantage of it. The implication is that the philanthrôpia shown by 
the Athenians is directed towards those that do not deserve the favours they ask for. The 
wrongdoers have no right to lenient treatment and the Athenians have no obligation to deal 
leniently with them. They do so out of philanthrôpia, which comes into play when the leniency 
is not part of the kind of reciprocity that is fundamental to any interaction based on timê (as 
worth and recognition of that worth).79 We should also not read too much in the expression οὐδὲ 
τοὺς δούλους ὑβρίζεσθαι ἀξιοῖ –  ἀξιοῖ refers to the character of the action itself, not to any 
effects on the timê of the slaves or to any claim to ‘worth’ on their part.80 This is clear from the 
                                               
76 Cf. Klees (1975) 165-67. Kant (1997) 212 (27:459) made the same point about animals: a man’s treatment of 
animals reveals his character. There are in fact considerable similarities between the foundations of some modern 
normative views about proper treatment of animals and ancient discourse about hubris against slaves. Note, for 
instance, that in Aristotle (Hist. An. 617b26, 630a9) philanthrôpia can be exercised towards animals (cf. n. 77 
below). For a discussion of Kantian ethics and duties to animals, see Korsgaard (2004). 
77 This is clearly the case, given then etymological meaning of the term/concept. Yet we would probably do well 
not to push the implications of the recognition of this basic humanity too hard – after all (as noted in n. 76), 
Aristotle writes of philanthrôpia towards animals (Hist. An. 617b26, 630a9). 
78 On philanthrôpia in Athenian ideology as an attribute of the Athenians see Dover (1974) 201-05; Christ (2013); 
Canevaro (2016) 370-71; (2017b) 85-86. For later reflections on Athenian philanthropia see Holton 2017, and for 
the development on the concept in the Hellenistic period see Gray (2013). 
79 See Canevaro (2013) 132-38 on this law. Cf. Konstan (2005) 22-24 and (2006) 214-18 on Arist. Poet. 1453a2-
6: to philanthrôpon is singled out by Aristotle as a possible sympathetic emotional reaction when a bad man is 
brought to ruin, in spite of the fact that the bad man deserves his ruin. Pity, on the other hand, has to do with 
undeserved misfortune, while phobos involves identification. Thus, also in Aristotle, philanthrôpia is 
characterized as an emotional reaction that is unrelated to desert, justice or status. An appreciation of the use of 
philanthrôpia in Attic oratory strengthens Konstan’s case on its place in Aristotle’s discussion of emotional 
reactions in the Poetics, pace e.g. Apicella Ricciardelli (1971-1972), Carey (1988) 137-39, Zierl (1994) 24, 28, 
138, Heath (2008) 9-10 n. 31, who read philanthrôpia in this context as referring to pleasure in the wicked 
individual’s misfortune – the sight of a bad person’s fall into misfortune would be pleasing, gratifying. 
80 Note that the same context is reformulated a couple of lines later as οὐδὲ τούτους ὑβρίζειν ἀξιοῦσιν –
ἀξιοῦσιν expresses the Athenians’ independent assessment of what constitutes honourable behaviour, it is about 
the actions, not about the ‘worth’ of the slaves. 
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following discussion. Demosthenes introduces the barbarians as fictitious interlocutors and 
pictures their amazement at the discovery that, despite the many wrongs the Greeks have 
suffered from them and the ancestral and natural hostility towards them, the Athenians 
criminalize hubris committed towards those barbarians that they have bought as slaves. He 
ironically concludes that if the barbarians knew of the law on hubris, they would make the 
Athenians collectively their proxenoi. Fisher reads in this passage an implicit admission ‘that 
the Athenians chose to extend to slaves legal protection against the evils of hubris out of 
genuinely humane sentiment towards the feelings of honour in these inferior beings’.81 But there 
is no such admission in the passage: the point of the mention of philanthrôpia and of the whole 
rhetorical device of having the barbarians discuss the wrongs they have committed against the 
Greeks, the natural hostility etc., is precisely to describe the prohibition on hubris towards 
slaves as independent of any desert of the slaves, as supererogatory. The passage actually 
denies that the slaves have any claim to timê and stresses that they do not actually deserve the 
protection from abuse enforced by the law. They are given it not because of their claims to 
timê, but because the Athenians consider that behaviour unacceptable whoever the victim. 
As it was conceptualized in Athenian law and public discourse, the prohibition on hubris 
against slaves did not recognize the slaves’ claims to timê. Its point was to sanction self-
aggrandizing behaviour which reflected an individual’s overestimation of his claims to timê 
beyond community standards and what the community was willing to recognize in  him. In 
what cases, and how often, the graphê hubreôs may have been used for behaviour against 
slaves is anyone’s guess. We should not assume that the scarcity of attestations in the sources 
must reflect the fact that the law was never used in this way.82 The picture the orators provide 
of the people usually appearing in the Athenian courts, and of the kind of actions normally 
brought, is sketchy and arguably biased by the logographical nature of the extant speeches.83 
But because a charge of hubris needed to prove that the offender had overstepped his 
prerogatives, we may assume that hubris committed by masters against their slaves must have 
been exceptionally hard to prove, given the fact that, according to Athenian law, virtually any 
treatment of a slave (including killing him) was within the master’s prerogatives.84 A good 
parallel for the situation in Athens, with the graphê hubreôs formally sanctioning abusive 
behaviour against slaves but not according them any rights per se, let alone vis-à-vis their 
masters and their extensive rights of punishing them, is that of the American South and the 
Caribbean. As Peabody explains, ‘In 1669, the Virginia House of Burgesses established that 
masters might kill their own slaves with impunity as they administered “due correction”.’ Paton 
points out that ‘Slaveholders had a great deal of power to punish their slaves privately. The 
first comprehensive Jamaican slave code, passed in 1664 …, placed almost no limits on the 
slaveholder’s power to “correct” his or her slaves. Masters were not allowed to “wantonly” kill 
their slaves, but if a slave died in the course of a punishment for a “misdemeanor,” the law 
stated that “noe person shall be accomptable to any law.” The 1696 slave code, which persisted 
almost unchanged until 1788, did not mention what was to happen if a slave died in the course 
of being punished. It did make the “willing, wanton, or bloody-minded” killing of a slave a 
                                               
81 Fisher (1995) 74. 
82 See n. 4 above. 
83 The picture offered by the phialai inscriptions, in Harris’ new interpretation (forthcoming b), is remarkably 
different. 
84 See Section 2 above for acceptable treatment of slaves. Cohen’s view that the law on hubris protected slaves 
from all sorts of abuse ((2000) 160-67; 1998, 116 n. 62), and Morrow’s that it allowed third parties to prosecute 
masters for mistreating their slaves (1937), are untenable, see Section 2 above. 
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“clergyable” felony, for which a person convicted would receive the minor punishment of 
being burned in the hand.’85 
To speculate a bit, if mistreatment of a slave by the master was ever actionable in Athens, 
that must have been connected with the context of the abuse (and therefore with its audience): 
a master certainly had the right to beat his own slave to a pulp, but doing so in somebody else’s 
house against the host’s desires, perhaps in front of the womenfolk, or even worse during a 
religious ritual or at a procession, might have given rise to accusations of hubris – it was not 
among the master’s prerogatives to behave in such a way in that context. More usually, 
accusations of hubris against slaves must have arisen from mistreatment of other people’s 
slaves, presumably in those contexts in which social interaction between free and slaves was 
constant and random abuse of slaves would have been very disruptive of social life and 
economic activities.86 The formal and informal sites of collective association discussed by 
Vlassopoulos and Sobak – workshops, associations, workplaces (for instance building sites), 
the commercial world of overseas trading, money-lending and banking, certain religious 
contexts, as well as the interactions of guests and entertainers at various symposia and festival-
based banquets – are very likely candidates.87 And, in fact, the only plausible case of hubris 
against a slave resulting in our sources in a legal action, that of the Rhodian lyre player 
assaulted by Themistius of Aphidna at the Eleusinia (Din. 1.23), has exactly one of these 
contexts as its setting. 
I have argued in this article that, in the discourse and conceptualization of hubris at the level 
of Athenian law and institutions, the possibility of sanctioning hubris against slaves did not 
imply any recognition of the slaves’ claims to timê.88 This argument applies to public discourse, 
ideology and law, but I do not claim that it applies more generally to social reality. As observed 
by Lewis in his criticism of Patterson’s definition of slavery, any attempt to remove slaves ‘tout 
court from the dialectic of esteem and honour that characterizes social relations in any society’ 
is deeply problematic.89 Whenever, in any social context, one social actor interacts with another, 
there must be some level of reciprocal respect and recognition of the other’s claims, whatever 
the relative status of the actors. In Greek, these social dynamics, at all levels, were expressed 
in the language of timê, which meant that slaves were in fact in many contexts and relations 
recognized as possessing a level of honour. Fisher has usefully highlighted that in the advice 
on slave management that we find for instance in Xenophon’ Oeconomicus, praise and honour 
feature prominently as instruments to incentivize slaves, and Ischomachus goes so far as to 
state that he treats his slaves as free men, ‘honouring’ them as kaloi kagathoi (14.6-10). He 
recognizes that they are capable of philotimia, and therefore accepts that they can become 
actors in social relations based on timê.90 But we should not assume that the honour granted to 
a slave in the private context of a household, regulated and enforced by the master, or in the 
context of other informal relations, was automatically translatable to all other social and 
                                               
85 Peabody (2011) 618 and Paton (2001) 926. For an actual example of such killings and the lack of legal 
consequences on the grounds that they were within the prerogatives of the masters (or the overseers) to discipline 
slaves, see the description of the overseer Mr. Gore by Frederick Douglass (Gates (2002) 356-57). 
86 A case in point would be Dem. 54.4. 
87 See Taylor and Vlassopoulos (2015) passim for these settings, and particularly Vlassopoulos (2015); Hunt 
(2015); Gabrielsen (2015). 
88 Lenient treatment could be justified, in the institutional context of the lawcourts, by appeals to philanthrôpia, 
which implies some recognition of the slaves’ humanity, and yet philanthrôpia did not involve the dynamics of 
reciprocity and the mutual obligations central to interactions based on timê, as shown elsewhere in this section. 
89 See Lewis (2017) against Patterson’s definition of slaves as (among other features) ‘generally dishonoured 
persons’ (Patterson (1982) 13). 
90 Fisher (1995) 55-57. See also Klees (1975) 82–83. On philotimia and its importance in Greek ethics and in 
particular in public honours and euergetism see Whitehead (1983); (1993); Liddel (2007) 166-70; Ferrucci (2013); 
Canevaro (2016) 78-79, 83-87; Domingo Gygax (2016) 211-12, 220-25. 
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institutional spheres. As Appiah has shown, a person’s status and honour are variable 
depending on the actual or internalized audience (for instance one can be quite honoured in 
one group and deeply dishonoured in another). Rabbås uses the expression ‘arena of honor’ 
which he defines as ‘the practical context within which a person’s honorable status is 
practically relevant and something to be respected’.91 Whatever timê a slave may have been 
accorded within his household by his master vis à vis other slaves, or in other informal contexts 
even vis à vis free individuals, it is very clear that no such timê was recognized in slaves at the 
level of the laws and institutions of the Athenian state, where the reference audience were the 
Athenian citizens in various institutional capacities – the latitude the law left to masters in how 
they could treat and abuse slaves, and the length to which the orators went in denying any 
actual claims to respect for slaves are evidence of this.92 
These considerations bring us back to the issue, which I introduced at the beginning of this 
article, of the relationship in Athens between the legal and institutional sphere, with its rules, 
values and conceptualizations of social life, and the ‘free spaces’ where social and economic 
interactions regularly occurred across the free/slave divide. As Vlassopoulos has observed, we 
cannot, and should not, assume that ideas and conceptualizations normally at work in the 
institutional sphere automatically reflect social reality.93 We should rather investigate the 
reasons for these values and rules, as well as how they interacted with the more fluid social 
dynamics of the associations, workshops, ‘free spaces’ that composed the texture of Athenian 
society. Legal discourse on the issue of hubris against slaves in fourth-century Athens is 
evidence that, whatever the social capital a slave could accrue in various formal and informal 
sites of collective association (viz. in particular ‘honour arenas’), that timê (as status, worth, 
social capital) was explicitly not recognized in the institutional sphere, viz. in the ‘honour 
arena’ of the Athenian state as managed by the Athenian citizens. Acknowledging any such 
timê in slaves would have meant recognizing that they possessed a modicum of rights and 
prerogatives, which would have clashed unacceptably with the rights of ownership of the free 
as slave-masters, one of the central preoccupations of the legal order.94 On the other hand, a 
clearer understanding of the law on hubris allows us to nuance the opposition postulated by 
some scholarship between the social reality and the formal institutions of the state. The law on 
hubris denied slaves any claim to timê and yet, without any conceptual contradiction, still 
managed to forbid and sanction abusive behaviour, even against slaves, that could hamper the 
smooth working of those formal and informal sites of collective association whose importance 
for the success of democracy Sobak has so persuasively demonstrated. The Athenian citizens, 
in their institutional role, did not acknowledge the timê of slaves, but they exercised strong 
control on each free individual’s claims to timê and policed excessive self-assertion and 
overestimation of one’s claims. This made strong demands on individuals as to what 
constituted honourable behaviour, in a variety of formal and informal social contexts. These 
demands, and legal devices such as the graphê hubreôs which were in place to enforce them, 
are evidence, at the level of the Athenian state, not of opposition to interactions across formal 
                                               
91 Rabbås (2015) 634; Appiah (2010) 19-22 speaks of the ‘honor world’ as ‘a group of people who acknowledge 
the same codes’. This understanding of ‘honour arenas’ which are separate yet connected has points of contact 
with the ‘choral’ approach to social history advocated in Azoulay and Ismard (2018).  
92 See Section 2 above on the powers of masters over their slaves, and this section on the explicit denial of the 
slaves’ claim to timê in the lawcourts. It is interesting that at Xen. Oec. 14.6-10 Ischomachus states that he acts 
as a legislator over his slaves, governing them by a hybrid body of laws drawn from Solon, Dracon and the King 
of Persia. In this context, the owner is like the tyrant of his own little kingdom, described as completely separate 
from the polis at large, with its own laws and therefore a very distinctive ‘arena of honour’. 
93 Vlassopoulos (2016). 
94 On the centrality of the concept and rights of ownership in Greek slavery (and in manifestations of slavery), 
against attempts to deny the centrality of this aspect, see Lewis (2018) 25-81 and passim. 
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legal boundaries, but rather of a concern for facilitating them and making them secure while 
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